We investigate the interaction between two terms of payment, supplier credit sales and customer advance payment. We find evidence that advance payments may signal customer creditworthiness and increase trade credit extension when we control for vendor size in international transactions or for the traded goods characteristics.
Introduction
Firms use a variety of payment terms to settle their transactions of goods and services.
When deciding payment terms, suppliers simultaneously determine their sales on trade credit, their demand for cash in advance, and their cash sales. This paper considers whether, depending on the characteristics of the trading partnership, firms use supplier credit and customer prepayment as substitute or complement payment terms.
We add a different angle to the view that payment terms offer firms contractual solutions to informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers. (Pike et al., 2005) or focus on the relative use of net terms versus two-part trade credit terms (Ng et al., 1999) . Eck et al. (2012) consider separately the case of exporter firms which condition larger export volumes on receiving advance payments from importers as a signal of creditworthiness, and the case of exporters that secure larger sales by signalling quality to importers through trade credit extension.
advance from their customers, we show that small vendors of differentiated goods and exporters of standardized goods increase their credit sales if they receive advance payments.
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The following section presents our empirical methodology and data analysis. Section 3 presents our empirical results and the final section concludes.
Empirical methodology and data analysis
We use the following baseline specification to explain trade credit extension by firms:
where TD is trade credit extended scaled by firm turnover. CIA is a dummy variable taking value 1 if firms receive advance payments, 0 otherwise. A negative coefficient β 1 implies that firms substitute the two terms of payment, i.e. they sell less on credit if they receive advance payments from their customers (H1). We gauge firm's export participation ( The matrix of controls (X) includes the ratio of bank loans to sales (BankLoans), as it has been shown that trade credit extension depends on access to external finance allowing firms to continue production (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). The total stock of inventories scaled by sales (Inventories) measures the incentives firms have to increase sales (and reduce inventories) by offering trade credit (Bougheas et al., 2009; Daripa and Nilsen, 2011) . Other controls include Liquidity (liquid assets to sales), Profits (profit for the period scaled by sales), a measure of the likelihood of company failure in the near future (Risk), and firm age (log).
Finally, Size (1 if the firm's total assets are below the upper quartile of the assets distribution of all firms in the same industry and year, 0 otherwise) captures vendor bargaining power.
We expect trade credit usage to vary significantly across industries, but be rather similar within industries (Ng et al, 1999) . To account for transacted goods characteristics, in line with Giannetti et al. (2011), we use the SIC industry codes to separate firms producing differentiated goods (often tailored to the needs of particular customers) from firms trading standardized (heterogeneous off-the-shelf) products. Thus, we control for sector-specific (v jt ), firm-specific (α i ), and time-invariant effects (d t ) in our estimations.
Our empirical approach reflects the fact that firms' sales strategies simultaneously impact on their sales on credit, the advance payments demanded from their customers, their use of bank loans and their stocks of inventories. We therefore opt to rely on a reduced form two stage least squares analysis and implement the GMM estimation of the fixed-effects panel data models with endogenous regressors.
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We draw our sample from the Diane database collected by Bureau van Dijk for French manufacturing firms. Most firms in our sample are not quoted on the stock exchange.
Firms with less than three consecutive yearly observations and the one percent tails for the main variables are dropped to control for the potential influence of outliers. The final sample includes about 147,000 observations over the period 1999-2007.
Empirical results
The estimates in Table 1 show that firms use supplier credit and cash in advance ( Trading specialised goods involves both higher seller uncertainty and stronger customer dependency on successful transactions. This increases both credit sales volumes (Cuñat, 2007; Giannetti et al., 2011) and the likelihood of advance payments (Mateut, 2012) .
Columns (6)- (9) report estimates for producers of differentiated vs. standardized products separately. We notice that the signalling effect of CIA is present for all size types of exporters of homogenous goods. Interestingly, in the differentiated sector, the coefficients for the main variables change sign across size classes (magnitudes for small firms are given by the sum of the coefficients for the interacted and non-interacted variables). Small producers of specific goods use credit sales and advance payments as complements. Export participation enhances credit sales of these firms, probably until they establish a reputation in foreign markets. Our results imply that CIA could resolve one dimension of transaction uncertainty: seller uncertainty -transactions involving specific products; buyer uncertainty -homogenous goods sold abroad.
In separate tests, we replace the dummy variable CIA it with the amount paid in advance (relative to sales). Our results suggest that larger advance payments reduce the proportion of credit sales but we fail to find evidence of a signalling role for advance payments. This would imply that not the volume but the decision to (partially) pay in advance helps resolve uncertainty in international trade. The following sensitivity tests confirm the results above: excluding purely domestic firms from our sample; changing the cut-off for the size classification to the top third of the assets distribution for all firms in the same industry and year; replacing the sector-specific with more detailed industry-specific effects.
Conclusions
We show that, although many firms use supplier credit and cash in advance as substitutes, advance payments and credits sales are complementary terms of payment for some categories of firms, namely small vendors of differentiated goods and exporters of standardized goods.
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Empirical results
The dependent variable is trade credit extended scaled by sales. CIA equals 1 if the firm receives advance payments, 0 otherwise. Export participation is proxied by a dummy taking value 1 if the firm exports, 0 otherwise, in columns 1-3, 6-9 and by the logarithm of export sales in columns 4-5. Controls include the ratios to sales of the stocks of inventories (Inventories); short-term bank loans (BankLoans); firm's profit (or loss) for the period (Profits); firm's liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and other current assets) (Liquidity). Risk measures the likelihood of company failure, where a higher value indicates that the firm is more risky. Age is the logarithm of the number of years since the firm was established; Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm's assets are below the upper quartile of the assets distribution for all firms in the same industry and year, 0 otherwise. Time effects and sector-specific time effects (columns 1-5) or industry-specific effects (columns 6-9) are included.
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